这是解决道德风险问题的最后一步。
This is the final step in addressing the problem of moral hazard.
道德风险问题导致旅行社质量供给不足。
Because of the moral hazard, the service quality of the travel industry is very low.
其中更加引入瞩目的是注册会计师的道德风险问题。
另一方面，也造成了不容忽视的逆向选择和道德风险问题。
On the other hand, have caused reverse choice and morals risk question that can't be ignored either.
加重责任制度抑制了金融控殷公司中特有的道德风险问题。
Their existence causes are the special moral hazards of financial holding companies.
因此本文要研究的是保险代理人与保险公司的道德风险问题。
So what the paper wants to study is the moral hazard problem of the agent and insurance company.
然而，如果幻想生前预嘱能解决道德风险问题，那我们就太激进了。
Yet it is a huge leap to imagine that living wills can resolve moral hazard.
人力资源道德风险问题一直是困扰现代企业人力资源管理的难题。
然而，如果幻想生前预嘱能解决道德风险问题，那我们就太激进了。
Yet it is a huge leap to imagine that living wills can resolve moral hazard .
研究表明，在某种程度上，声誉效应能很好地解决该道德风险问题。
The research indicates the reputation effect can solve the moral hazard in some extent.
同时，这一制度运用所可能引发的道德风险问题也引起了人们的关注。
Meanwhile, the moral hazard produced by the system itself has also drawn people's attention.
与此同时，由于信息不对称导致的逆向选择和道德风险问题也日益严重。
At the same time, adverse selection and moral hazard caused by asymmetric information have become big problems.
道德风险问题和契约机制是当今世界许多经济学者研究的重点和难点问题。
Moral hazard problems and contract schemes are considerable issues and the toughest questions which a lot of economic scholars study of at presents.
为解决逆向选择和道德风险问题，会计被赋予决策有用性和契约有效性的功能。
To solve the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard, accounting is characterized decision usefulness and the validity of contract.
委托人和代理人在公司信息方面的过度自信偏差都将提高代理成本、恶化道德风险问题。
The overconfidence bias of the principal and agent on the would firm ' s common signal quality of increase agency cost and worsen the moral hazard problem.
另一方面，拥有不完全信息的LOLR 容易引发道德风险问题，从而是事前无效率的。
On the other hand, the presence of an imperfectly informed LOLR is conductive to the moral hazard problem, So it is ex ante inefficiency.
由于信息贫乏，再加上健康保险出现的逆向选择和道德风险问题，保健市场可能是无效率的。
Health markets may be inefficient because of poor information, and because of the adverse selection and moral hazard problems associated with health insurance.
然后通过支付函数的全微分，来揭示供应链中的道德风险问题，从而证明供应链内部存在囚徒困境现象。
Through function's differential, it finds the moral hazard between manufacturer and retailer, which proves the existence of Prisoners Dilemma it finds the supply chain.
本文主要思想来源于委托-代理模型，用于解决委托人与代理人由于信息不对称而引发的道德风险问题。
The main thought of this article stems from principal-agent model which had been used for solving moral hazard problems because of information asymmetry between principal and agent.
在分析其委托代理问题的特点并构建结构模型的基础上，利用博弈论相关理论研究其中的道德风险问题。
Based on the analysis of principal-agent problem and its structure model, this paper studied the moral hazard problem by using game theory.
不幸的是，强制责任保险会带来被保险人（致害人）的道德风险问题，从而可能降低整个社会的安全水平。
Unfortunately, this insurance will bring about moral hazard problem for the insured(harmer), hence lowering the security level of the whole society.
在道德风险问题的委托代理关系中，委托人对代理人行动的监督与对自然状态的观测所起的效果是等价的。
In the principle-agent problem with moral hazard, the observation of the state of nature has the same effect with the monitoring of agent's action.
由于事后不对称信息的存在，在信贷市场中道德风险问题经常发生，而使用抵押则普遍存在道德风险问题。
Because of the ex post asymmetric information, moral hazard problems often arise in credit markets. A natural explanation for the use of collateral is the existence of the moral hazard problems.
针对信息不对称所产生的双重道德风险问题，研究了业界广泛使用的产品回购合约对供应链整体绩效的影响。
In order to solve the double moral hazard problem due to incomplete information, an impact on the performance of supply chain by buy-back contract was studied.
针对信息不对称所产生的双重道德风险问题，研究了业界广泛使用的产品回购合约对供应链整体绩效的影响。
The buy back policy aiming at solving the inefficient problems aroused by asymmetric information and incompatible incentives in the supply chain has been applied abroad in practice.
然而以往的研究主要集中在投保人的道德风险问题上，很少或忽视了对保险代理人和保险公司道德风险的研究。
The forecast studies focus on the insured 's moral hazard, rarely or even neglect the agent and insurance company.
然而以往的研究主要集中在投保人的道德风险问题上，很少或忽视了对保险代理人和保险公司道德风险的研究。
The forecast studies focus on the insured 's moral hazard, rarely or even neglect the agent and insurance company.
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