本文力图表明蒯因对同一性问题并没有作出合适的解释。
We will show in this paper that Quine don t make a satisfactory explanation for the problem of identity.
蒯因通过对第二类分析陈述的质疑，否定分析与综合的区分。
Through querying the second class of analytic statements, Quine denied the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.
蒯因的说法是否成立，直到今天依然是哲学上众说纷纭的话题。
Whether Quine was right remains the bone of vigorous philosophical contention to this day.
对蒯因来说，类或相似性的概念也必须加以自然化，就如同知识论的自然化一样。
The concepts of "kinds" or "similarity", just as Quine's epistemology, are expected to be naturalized.
一直到蒯因自然化认识论的提出，弗雷格的反心理主义思想都在逻辑学领域占有权威地位。
Until the naturalized epistemology of Quine is suggested, the anti-psychologism of Frege in logical area is authority.
蒯因的主要目标是认识论中的经验主义传统，但他的结论却与整个分析哲学的议程密切相关。
Quine's target was mainly the empiricist tradition in epistemology, but his conclusions were patently germane to the agenda of analytical philosophy.
好了，如果蒯因是对的而且不存在那些关于概念的事实，那么就不存在任何东西可以支撑模态直觉。
Well, but if Quine is right and there aren't any such facts about concepts, then there is nothing to vindicate modal intuitions.
蒯因认为，哲学的一个重要任务就是证明怎样能使我们关于世界的理论更加简单化、明晰化、系统化。
Quine believed that one important task of philosophy was to prove how to make the theory about the world more simple, clear and systematic.
将分析哲学从蒯因造成的尴尬中拯救出来的途径，是建构某些关于必然性的专用观念，而这类观念毋须借助于概念真理。
The way to save analytic philosophy from the embarrassments Quine raised is to construct some proprietary notion of necessity that doesn't presuppose the notion of conceptual truth.
第一部分是蒯因对符合论、 融贯论、塔尔斯基语义真理论等传统真理观以及同时代的逻辑经验主义真理观的批判继承。
The first part is about Quine's criticism and inheritance to the traditional perspectives to truth, like the correspondence theory , the coherence theory and Tarski's semantic theory of truth.
克里·普克关于先验偶然命题和后验必然命题的观点，是对蒯因关于分析命题和综合命题的观点的进一步推进和具体化。
Kripke's view on the priori contingent and the posteriori necessary propositions is a development and concretization of Quine's view on analytical and synthetic propositions.
所以，透过对于自然类的议题，我主张蒯因是属于温和的自然主义知识论者，而孔布里斯则是属于极端的自然主义知识论者。
Based on different views of natural kinds, I conclude that Quine's version of naturalistic epistemology is a modest standpoint, and Kornblith's version is a more radical one.
所以，透过对于自然类的议题，我主张蒯因是属于温和的自然主义知识论者，而孔布里斯则是属于极端的自然主义知识论者。
Based on different views of natural kinds, I conclude that Quine's version of naturalistic epistemology is a modest standpoint, and Kornblith's version is a more radical one.
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