运用博弈论中的第一价格暗标拍卖原理，研究发电公司的不完全信息竞价博弈模型。
The bidding model of power plant company with incomplete information in unilateral open electricity market is analyzed by using the first price sealed bid auction.
在采用暗标拍卖的电力市场环境中，发电公司可以通过估计竞争对手的报价行为来构造最优的报价策略。
In sealed auction based electricity markets, generation companies could develop their optimal bidding strategies through estimating bidding behaviors of competitors.
在采用暗标拍卖的电力市场环境中，发电公司可以通过估计竞争对手的报价行为来构造最优的报价策略。
In sealed auction based electricity markets, generation companies could develop their optimal bidding strategies through estimating bidding behaviors of competitors.
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