在危机管理和冲突分析中，力量对等冲突方之间的相互威慑是否具有稳定性问题，一直存在疑义。
In crisis management and conflict analysis, it is an unsolved problem whether pairwise mutual deterrence has stability.
理性威慑理论将相互威慑看作是一种讨价还价过程，但鲁宾斯坦经典讨价还价模型无法直接用于相互威慑讨价还价研究。
In rational deterrence theory mutual deterrence is considered as a kind of bargaining process, but the classical Rubinstein bargaining model can not be directly applied to it.
实际上，中国在经济上陷入的困局，类同于冷战中核威慑理论家所形容的“相互保证毁灭”。
In effect, it is trapped in the economic equivalent of the mutually assured destruction described by theorists of nuclear deterrence in the cold war.
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