大股东侵占的理论基础是大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题,而代理问题产生的条件是控制权与现金流量权的分离。
It is the main problem that this paper to be studied. The theoretical basis of large shareholders expropriation is the agency problem between large shareholders and medium-small shareholders.
本文基于最终产权的观点,追溯我国上市公司的控制链,研究发现我国大多数的上市公司的投票权和现金流量权并没有发生分离。
Based on the issue of ultimate ownership, this paper retraces the control-chain of listed companies, it shows that most listed companies do not separate the control rights from the cash flow rights.
考虑权力制衡对公司价值的影响,发现当控股股东的控制力和其现金流量权分离越大时,公司价值越低。股权制衡和控制权竞争程度越高时,公司价值越高。
Consider the effect of the balance power of shareholder, it shows the higher degree of the separation, the lower the company value it gets.
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