本文通过模型分析得出企业家报酬业绩敏感性系数的影响因素，进而对企业家报酬实证研究的结果给出一个基本的解释。
The paper draws factors that influence the sensitiveness of compensation - performance in term of model analysis and proposes a basic explanation to executive remuneration.
早期的主流学派代理理论集中于对报酬与业绩的敏感性研究。
In early stage, agency theory, the mainstream school on the issue, has focused on pay_performance sensitivity.
导致报酬与业绩间缺乏敏感性的原因之一是报酬棘轮效应的存在。
We argue that the existence of ratchet effect is one of the reasons that result in the lack of sensitivity of compensation and performance.
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