研究表明：如果上、下游企业进行两阶段动态博弈，该契约不会是一个子博弈精炼纳什均衡。
It is shown that, if the upstream and downstream firms play two-stage dynamic game, the contract is not a perfect Nash equilibrium.
并得到了与外生运输成本的二阶段模型不同的子博弈精炼纳什均衡结果。
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is different with that in two-stage game with exogenous transportation costs.
本文在对利益相关者进行合理界定的基础上，运用合作博弈数学模型，求证利益相关者博弈的子博弈精炼纳什均衡解的唯一性。
Based on reasonable definition of stakeholder and cooperative gambling model, the uniqueness of sub-gambling refining Nash equilibrium among stakeholders is tried to get.
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