加强制度和组织建设，减少权力寻租现象和委托代理成本；
Enhancement system and the organization construction to reduce the rent seeking behaviors and principal-agent problems;
股权激励是现代企业在所有权和经营权相分离的情况下，解决委托代理成本问题的一种激励措施。
Stock ownership incentive is an incentive measure on resolving the problem of agency cost in case of the "Separation of Ownership and Control"of modern corporations.
本文将股利政策作为一个可观测变量引入单层、双重委托代理模型，详细分析了降低代理成本的途径。
This article builds single and double principal-agent theory models and studies measures to reduce agent cost by using dividend policy as an observable variable.
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