A study is made in this paper of the credit decision mechanism against adverse selection in a competitive market with asymmetric information when entrepreneurs are riskaverse.
研究了在竞争的信贷市场中，对风险厌恶型投资者克服逆向选择作用的信贷决策机制，提出了这种机制应满足的性质。
This paper studies the decision mechanism of credit risk in the credit markets of the commercial Banks with imperfect information.
本文研究商业银行的信贷市场在不完全信息下银行信贷风险的决策机制。
Through introducing the theory and the methods of incentive mechanism design from the point of view of the minimum of the funds risk a credit-risk decision model for banks is established.
从银行信贷资金风险极小化的角度出发，通过引入激励机制设计的理论和方法，建立了银行信贷风险决策模型。
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