在重复博弈及信息充分传递的情况下，声誉效应可以成为一种影响行为主体行动选择的激励机制。
In repeated games and the enough transfer of information, the reputation effect can be an incentive mechanism to affect people' s choice of action .
本文分析了食品供给链中行为主体间在一次博弈、重复博弈和不完全信息动态博弈下的战略选择。
This paper analyses players' strategy under single game, repeated games and dynamic game with incomplete information in food supply chain.
通过对基金各行为主体的博弈分析，发现信息结构对基金管理人的经营行为有重大影响。
Through the analysis on fund's different aspects, it's discovered that informational structure has a big impact on fund manager's operating behavior.
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