不完全信息模型是现代计量信用风险违约概率最前沿的理论，它认为投资者从市场上获得的信息并非完全信息。
Incomplete information model is one of the most advanced credit risk model to calculate default rate. It believes that the information investors can get from markets is incomplete.
本文利用不完全信息动态博弈模型，探讨了金融危机、监管者的软预算约束与银行道德风险之间的关系。
Using a dynamic game model of incomplete information, this paper discusses the relations among financial crisis, regulators soft budget constraints and bankers moral hazard.
基于对挑战者与威慑者双边不完全信息条件下军事威逼模型博弈均衡的求解，探讨了军事威逼成功应满足的条件。
The game equilibriums of the compellence model with incomplete information of both challenger and the deterer are computed, and the conditions of successful compellence are studied.
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