No,according to the personality theory, what personal identity requires isn't item-for-item the same personality, but rather the same evolving personality.

不，根据人格理论，个人认同感并不需要一个完全相同的人格，而是同样在进化的人格。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

We can't answer that question until we are clearer about what does it take to have identity across time.

我们无法回答那个问题,除非我们知道,人格要穿越时间需要什么条件。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

and they reply in German, "Yes, I'm French," that doesn't--language doesn't necessarily tell you how people feel about their identity. Some sage once said, I don't know who it was, but I love this expression, that a language is a dialect with a powerful army.

然后他们用德语回答,"我是法国人",不一定--语言不一定能代表,对自己的身份认同,有个哲人说过,我忘了是谁,但我特喜欢这句,说语言就是有强大军队撑腰的方言

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Even if there're no souls, we don't have to say that the key to personal identity is the sameness of the body.

即使没有灵魂的存在，我们也不用,肯定人格同一性的关键在于,同样的肉体。

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So the secret to personal identity on this new proposal isn't sameness of body, is sameness of personality.

所以新提案中人格同一性的关键,不在于同样的肉体,而在于同样的人格。

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And it certainly looks as though if you don't believe in souls, you have to accept the body theory of personal identity.

而且很明显,如果你不信灵魂论，你就只能接受,人格同一性的肉体论了。

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So the problem of existence through time,or persistence through time, shouldn't be called the problem of personal identity,but just the problem of identity.

所以积年累月下来存在的问题，就不该叫做个人认同感的问题，而仅是认同感的问题。

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Well--what we think is very important here is the personality, why don't we just say-- the key to personal identity is the personality.

我们认定最重要的是,人格，我们就可以说-,人格同一性的关键在于人格。

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So body is the key to personal identity, we don't have to worry about the fact that we are constantly gaining and losing items.

因此肉体是人格同一性的关键，不必担心,肉体不停地新增或失去什么微粒。

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Rock believed in souls, he just didn't think they were the key to personal identity.

洛克相信灵魂论，但他认为,这并不是人格统一性的关键。

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Well--since I myself don't believe in souls, it's hard to surprise you to learn that I don't think the soul theory of personal identity is right.

因为我本身不相信灵魂的存在，所以你们肯定能想到,我认为人格同一性的灵魂论,不是正确的。

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To see that,recall the fact that according to the personality view, as a theory of personality identity, the crucial point isn't that my personality stay identical.

要明白这一点，回想一下根据人格理论，作为个人认同感的理论，关键点不在于人格要保持不变。

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And so when the personality theorist says the key to personal identity is the same personality. They don't mean literally the very same set of believes and desires.

所以当人格论专家说道,人格同一性的关键在于,同样的人格时，他们指的不是,一成不变的一系列信仰和渴望。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

Although I'm inclined to think that the body theory may be the best view about what's the key to personal identity, I'm also inclined to think it doesn't really matter.

虽然我倾向于觉得身体理论,也许是解释个人认同感的关键观点，我同样觉得，这其实根本无关紧要。

耶鲁公开课 - 死亡课程节选

So the body isn't the key to personal identity.

所以肉体并非个人认同感的关键。

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And tributary, of course, if you don't believe in souls, if you don't believe in soul's exist, that you certainly can't appear to the existence of souls, the continuative soul, the sameness of soul as the key to personal identity.

还有，必然地，如果你不相信灵魂这回事，如果你不相信它的存在，你肯定无法,进一步相信什么灵魂的延续，无法相信同样的灵魂,是保证人格同一性的关键。

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Bare survival of my soul,even though that is the key to personal identity-- if it is--bare survival of my soul doesn't give me what I want.

仅有我灵魂的存活，即便是个人认同感的关键-,也并没有给予我，我想要的任何东西。

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But of course, as we know and thinking about familiar objects, we don't need to have every single piece of an object, of an identity stay the same to have the same feeling.So-- I think previously I talked about the steering wheel on my car.

但很明显的,根据我们的常识，我们不需要要求,所有的物体，都保持不变,从而得到同一个肉体-,我记得我之前讨论过,我的汽车的方向盘。

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