但是银行也完全毁了他们自己，正像次级贷款那样，因为最终无限大的风险体现在银行资产负债表上，想必远远大于银行大佬们的预期。
But the Banks also damaged themselves thoroughly - as with subprime lending - because much of the ultimate risk ended up on Banks' balance sheets, presumably much more than the top bankers intended.
就在上个月，美国三大信用评分机构针对国内次级按揭市场固有风险的评估理念进行了彻底的检测。
The three big credit-rating agencies have overhauled their methods of assessing default risk in the American subprime-mortgage market in the past month.
美联储仅有的风险是，当它的某个借款者破产时，它还得持有着那些次级的资产。
The Fed only runs a risk of being left holding ropy assets if one of its counterparties goes bust.
次级贷灾难加强了这样一个观点，即反应性思维不能防止金融崩溃，分散化风险还只是个不完美的技巧。
The subprime disaster reinforced that reactive thinking can't avert a financial meltdown, and diversifying risk is still an imperfect art.
当投资者开始把注意力转移到与不合格的次级按揭以及其他的风险贷款挂钩的证券上时，银行便不再为投资者提供资金。
When investors began to turn their nose up at securities linked to souring subprime mortgages and other risky loans, Banks ended up financing them.
但是这些工具的复杂性和数量使的银行很难知道谁将承担额外的自于美国次级抵押贷款的违约风险。
Yet the complexity and number of such instruments lie behind banks' difficulties in knowing who will bear the ultimate exposure to defaults on American subprime mortgages.
是那些次级供应商——他们很少为人们所注意——是风险的所在。
It's in the secondary layers of suppliers - things that are smaller, barely noticed - where the greater risk is.
SIV因为次级抵押贷款证券风险而处境艰难。
SIVs have been struggling because of exposure to risky subprime-mortgage debt.
可次级承销商也在抱怨分得的战利品没有随之增加，因为他们认为投资银行对自身承担的风险漫天要价——那时发行价格低于市场价格的40%，这样，在投资银行血本无归之前，股票市场就不得不跳水了。
They think Banks were overpaid for the risks they took. Issues were priced as much as 40% below market prices so stocks would have had to plunge before Banks would be out of pocket.
美国国际集团指控美国银行向其兜售低风险不良抵押贷款证券，不良抵押贷款即次级抵押贷款【不知理解的对否】是指向信用程度较差和收入不高的借款人提供的贷款。
American International Group lodged a lawsuit against Bank of America, claiming BofA sold it low-risk securities backed by "defective" mortgages given to low-income borrowers.
当然，它也较早的接受了次级抵押房屋贷款——业务遍及全国的GoldenWest和IndyMac总部都设在加州——但是，生活在时代浪尖总会伴有风险。
Yes, it was also an early adopter of subprime mortgages — Countrywide, Golden West and IndyMac were all California-based — but life on the frontier has always been risky.
这两个庞然大物将私有公司挤压到了诸如次级贷款之类抵押市场最具风险的领域之中。
The two Leviathans have squeezed private firms into the riskiest ends of the mortgage market, such as subprime lending.
就在全球银行业深陷美国次级抵押贷款的泥潭之际，由于欧洲各银行对自身信用风险的评价方式各不相同，这使投资者平添了更多困扰。
As Banks globally grapple with souring investments tied to U.S. subprime mortgages, Europe's Banks have added to the problems for investors because they differ in how they value their credit exposure.
2007年，全国各地住房抵押贷款违约引发了高风险的次级房贷市场崩溃，造成了70年来最严重的经济衰退。
In 2007, mortgage defaults around the country sparked a crash in the high-risk sub-prime mortgage market, creating the worst recession in 70 years.
华盛顿互惠银行把很多资产投在高风险的次级房贷上，但是由于很多贷款者无法偿还贷款而负债高达几十亿美元。
Washington Mutual has been saddled with billions of dollars of debt because it heavily invested in selling risky subprime mortgages to customers who later defaulted on them.
那就扩大了风险更高证券的需求，包括次级抵押贷款，也导致了房产泡沫。
That expanded the demand for riskier securities, including subprime mortgages, and pumped up the real-estate bubble.
然而次级贷款危机爆发后，风险最终又返回到银行的资产负债表上。
But when the subprime crisis broke, the risks ended up back on the Banks' balance sheets after all.
次贷指的是次级抵押贷款，这不属于今天的讨论范围之内，次级抵押贷款是发放给特殊借款人的，他们不是优质客户，也就是说风险较大。
Subprime refers to mortgages, which is not the subject of today's lecture, but a subprime mortgage is a mortgage issued to a borrower who is not considered prime — not a good risk.
在充满风险的次级抵押贷款市场上，已经显现出了令人沮丧的迹象：违约和赎回权取消现象大幅增加。
At the risky, subprime end of the mortgage market, there are already signs of distress: defaults and foreclosures have been soaring.
如果说这类收购案并不是太糟的话，银行还在其他地方面临着与次级房贷危机有关的更大风险。
As if the buy-out issue was not bad enough, Banks face a bigger danger elsewhere, linked to the subprime-mortgage crisis.
加拿大从来没有美国遭遇过的高风险次级房贷造成的泡沫，原因之一是加拿大实行保守放贷。
Canada never had the kind of bubble created by risky 'subprime' home loans that the U.S. had, thanks in part to conservative lending practices.
鲁宾和其他银行家应该顶住诱惑，全面而如实地向公众披露银行在抵押债权凭证、次级抵押贷款和其他缩水资产上的风险敞口。
The temptation for Mr Rubin and others will be to hold back from revealing the full extent of the Banks' exposures to CDOs, subprime mortgages and other wilting assets.
次级意外死亡风险同样被打包并进行交易。
The risks of less unexpected deaths are also being packaged and traded.
以日本为例，它那些一度不稳定的金融机构如今资金需求较低，资本基础稳固，并且几乎不存在对次级贷款的风险敞口。
Take Japan, a country whose once-precarious financial institutions now have low funding needs, a solid capital base and little exposure to subprime loans.
高风险的次级贷款结合了高评级的优质贷款 打包成了“住房抵押贷款债券”（MBS）。
Risky, subprime loans, were combined with top rated, prime loans, andpackaged as Mortgaged Backed Securities (MBSs).
对于美国次级债及其证券衍生品携带的风险，评级机构并未及时发出警告。
The ratings agencies failed to sound the alarm in time on the risks carried by U.S. subprime mortgages and the securitized and derivatives products based on them.
对于美国次级债及其证券衍生品携带的风险，评级机构并未及时发出警告。
The ratings agencies failed to sound the alarm in time on the risks carried by U.S. subprime mortgages and the securitized and derivatives products based on them.
应用推荐