《东亚公司所有权与控制权的分离》，StijnClaessens,Simeon Djankov和Larry H . P.Lang《金融经济学杂志》，2000年十月。
"The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations", by Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov and Larry H.P. Lang. Journal of Financial Economics, October 2000.
从代理理论来说，公司治理所要解决的是由所有权与控制权分离所造成的代理人问题。
In agent theory, corporate governance is to deal with the agent problem which has resulted from the separation of proprietary and controlling rights.
这种控制方式的显著特点是产生了终极控制权与终极所有权的偏离，从而可能导致损害上市公司绩效行为的产生。
This control method is to produce a distinctive feature of the ultimate ownership and ultimate control of the deviation, which may cause damage to the performance behavior of listed companies.
此外，信息披露质量与实际控制人拥有上市公司所有权比例有正相关关系，而与控制层次之间是负相关关系。
Besides, quality of information disclosure has a positive correlation with the listed company's ownership percentage that the actual controller owns and a negative correlation with control hierarchy.
公司治理作为解决所有权与控制权分离问题的制度安排，受到了世界各国的关注。
Corporate governance, as a solution to the separation of ownership and control of the institutional arrangements, was concerned by all of countries in the world.
本文考察了我国上市公司所有权对企业价值的影响以及所有权与控制权分离对企业价值的影响。
This paper evaluates the corporate value effects of ownership structure and the separation of ownership and control rights.
本文考察了我国上市公司所有权对企业价值的影响以及所有权与控制权分离对企业价值的影响。
This paper evaluates the corporate value effects of ownership structure and the separation of ownership and control rights.
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