The full extent of the further concessions Secretary Baker has in mind has not been revealed.
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Well, as Secretary Baker and Congressman Hamilton have said, there are no silver bullets.
Secretary Baker should, accordingly, reassert the earlier U.S. position that such missiles must be banned by START.
As Secretary Baker negotiates on these points, he would be well advised to appreciate just how much rides on the outcome.
Secretary Baker is advising the President to veto the bill on the grounds that its sanctions language will unduly restrict presidential flexibility.
Some even expect that Secretary Baker will try to parlay this initiative into his designation as Don Rumsfeld's replacement at the Pentagon.
Secretary Baker's spokesmen have also attempted to dismiss a very thoughtful address by Vice President Dan Quayle in California on 17 October.
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It is particularly striking that the USSR today does not satisfy the criteria enunciated by Secretary Baker for recognition by the United States.
Everyone, that is, except the one country Secretary Baker insists must lubricate our deal with Tehran-Damascus by making still-further, strategically dangerous territorial concessions: Israel.
"Secretary Baker seems intent on projecting a vision of the Soviet Union that can only be described as one seen through rose-colored glasses, " said Frank J.
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The place to start would be to send Secretary Baker forthwith to Zagreb and Ljubljana to announce U.S. recognition and support for Croatian and Slovenian independence.
"By agreeing that mobile missiles should be limited instead of totally banned Secretary Baker has ensured that the START Treaty will be unverifiable, " Frank J.
Meanwhile, the center is imaginatively forging -- with Secretary Baker's apparent approval -- new arrangements for maintaining its life-support for communist regimes like those in Cuba and Afghanistan.
At the very least, Secretary Baker should refrain from offering to "encourage" such an alignment if only the Soviets will agree to permit the reunification of Germany to proceed.
In his haste to complete strategic and conventional arms agreements with Moscow, is Secretary Baker repeating widely reported mistakes he made last spring, notably by offering unnecessary and unwarranted concessions inimical to U.S. interests?
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Were Secretary Baker to agree to do so, however, he would ensure that the actual effect of the so-called "deep reductions" regime would likely be an asymmetrical one, highly disadvantageous to the United States.
Secretary Baker may be persuaded that the frenzy of concession-making conducted (largely behind the scenes) by his predecessor particularly during the final, post-election days of the Reagan administration must be terminated, even reversed.
The Center for Security Policy believes that both the original Dole initiative and the refinement just embraced by Secretary Baker should be put on ice at least until another, essentially painless option is thoroughly explored.
As he seeks to arrange a new marriage of convenience with Damascus, will Secretary Baker offer to drop Syria from the list of nations sponsoring international terrorism as was done with Iraq in the early 1980s?
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Secretary Baker's erosion of the milestones Moscow center was expected to achieve in order to qualify for U.S. and allied taxpayer-underwritten aid is occurring at the same moment that the serious shortfall in the Soviet transformation is becoming more apparent.
Finally, the foreign ministers may revisit an issue that had previously been resolved when Secretary Baker announced, prior to the last such ministerial in October 1989, that the United States would abandon its demand that mobile missiles be banned under START.
While the Center believes that Secretary Baker's contention that arms control agreements are mutually beneficial is debatable -- especially for those now in the works -- it nonetheless welcomes the Administration's stated openness to suspending initiatives in which the Soviets have a disproportionate interest.
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Has Secretary Baker considered to say nothing of taking any steps to contend with the security implications of integrating East Germany into NATO, even as several hundred thousand Soviet troops and unknown numbers of KGB and former Stasi personnel continue to operate there?
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For an image-conscious political operative like Secretary Baker, however, the most important message is a different one: If despite such willing American concession-making agreement cannot be reached by the end of the Moscow ministerial, the blame will rest squarely with the Soviet Union.
CENTERFORSECURITYPOLICY: At What Price Arms Control Agreements?
Just ten days ago, moreover, Secretary Baker told Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans in Paris that the United States was unwilling to confront the USSR over the Baltic states -- even though Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov had recently threatened renewed economic coercion if the Balts did not hew to Moscow's line.
The report entitled "Soviet Influence Activities" was scheduled to be disseminated in August but apparently its disclosures of aggressive Soviet efforts aimed at "hampering or defeating U.S. strategic interests worldwide" simply did not square with Secretary Baker's euphoria about the man who is ultimately responsible for this disinformation campaign -- Mikhail Gorbachev.
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The Center notes that, while it is easy enough to understand Secretary Baker's view that the massive internal Soviet opposition should see Gorbachev as a man with whom business can be done -- as the U.S., British and other G-7 governments so palpably do -- it is less obvious why such a callous, expediency-driven approach would appeal to reformers who know better.
Former education secretary Lord Baker is chairman of the Baker Dearing Educational Trust which promotes the introduction of UTCs.
Volcker actually motioned that he would resign right away, but Treasury Secretary James Baker convinced him to stick around.
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In the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, Secretary James Baker has negotiated a "framework agreement" to be initialed at the summit.
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